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Abstract
In dialogues in which both agents are autonomous, each
agent deliberates whether to accept or reject the con-
tributions of the current speaker. A speaker cannot
simply assume that a proposal or an assertion will
be accepted. However, an examination of a corpus
of naturally-occurring problem-solving dialogues shows
that agents often do not explicitly indicate acceptance
or rejection. Rather the speaker must infer whether the
hearer understands and accepts the current contribu-
tion based on indirect evidence provided by the hearer’s
next dialogue contribution. In this paper, I propose a
model of the role of informationally redundant utter-
ances in providing evidence to support inferences about
mutual understanding and acceptance. The model (1)
requires a theory of mutual belief that supports mu-
tual beliefs of various strengths; (2) explains the func-
tion of a class of informationally redundant utterances
that cannot be explained by other accounts; and (3)
contributes to a theory of dialogue by showing how
mutual beliefs can be inferred in the absence of the
master-slave assumption.
1 Introduction
It seems a perfectly valid rule of conversation not to
tell people what they already know. Indeed, Grice’s
quantity maxim has often been interpreted this way:
Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required[5]. Stalnaker, as well, suggests that to assert
something that is already presupposed is to attempt to
do something that is already done[14]. Thus, the notion
of what is informative is judged against a background
of what is presupposed, i.e. propositions that all conver-
sants assume are mutually known or believed. These
propositions are known as the common ground[10, 5].
The various formulations of this ‘no redundancy’ rule
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permeate many computational analyses of natural lan-
guage and notions of cooperativity. However consider
the following excerpt from the middle of an advisory
dialogue between Harry (h), a talk show host, and Ray
(r) his caller1.
Example 1:
( 6) r. uh 2 tax questions.
one: since April 81 we have had an
85 year old mother living with us.
her only income has been social security
plus approximately $3000 from a
certificate of deposit and i wonder
what’s the situation as far as
claiming her as a dependent or does
that income from the certificate of
deposit rule her out as a dependent?
( 7) h. yes it does.
( 8) r. IT DOES.
( 9) h. YUP THAT KNOCKS HER OUT.
.........
In standard information theoretic terms, both (8) and
(9) are redundant. Harry’s assertion in (9) simply
paraphrases what was said in (7) and (8) and so it
cannot be adding beliefs to the common ground2. Fur-
thermore, the truth of (9) cannot be in question, for in-
stead of (9), Harry could not say Yup, but that doesn’t
knock her out. So why does Ray (r) in (8) repeat
Harry’s (h) assertion of it does, and why does Harry
paraphrase himself and Ray in (9)?
My claim is that informationally redundant utterances
(IRU’s) have two main discourse functions: (1) to pro-
vide evidence to support the assumptions underlying
the inference of mutual beliefs, (2) to center a propo-
sition, ie. make or keep a proposition salient[6]. This
paper will focus on (1) leaving (2) for future work.
1These examples come from the talk show for financial advice,
Speaking of Your Money, on WCAU in Philadelphia. This cor-
pus was collected and transcribed by Martha Pollack and Julia
Hirschberg[12].
2(8) is not realized with a rising question intonation. This
will be discussed in section 6.1.
First consider the notion of evidence. One reason why
agents need evidence for beliefs is that they only have
partial information about: (1) the state of world; (2)
the effects of actions; (3) other agent’s beliefs, prefer-
ences and goals. This is especially true when it comes
to modelling the effects of linguistic actions. Linguistic
actions are different than physical actions. An agent’s
prior beliefs, preferences and goals cannot be ascer-
tained by direct inspection. This means that it is
difficult for the speaker to verify when an action has
achieved its expected result, and so giving and receiv-
ing evidence is critical and the process of establishing
mutual beliefs is carefully monitored by the conver-
sants.
The characterization of IRU’s as informationally re-
dundant follows from an axiomatization of action in
dialogue that I will call the deterministic model.
This model consists of a number of simplifying assump-
tions such as: (1) Propositions are are either believed
or not believed, (2) Propositions representing beliefs
and intentions get added to the context by the unilat-
eral action of one conversant, (3) Agents are logically
omniscient. (4) The context of a discourse is an undif-
ferentiated set of propositions with no specific relations
between them. I claim that these assumptions must be
dropped in order to explain the function of IRU’s in
dialogue.
Section 2 discusses assumption (1); section 3 shows how
assumption (2) can be dropped; section 4 discusses (3);
section 4.1 shows that some IRU’s facilitate the infer-
ence of relations between adjacent propositions.
2 Mutual Beliefs in a Shared En-
vironment
The account proposed here of how the common
ground is augmented, is based is Lewis’s shared en-
vironment model for common knowledge[10, 2]. In
this model, mutual beliefs depend on evidence, openly
available to the conversants, plus a number of under-
lying assumptions.
Shared Environment Mutual Belief In-
duction Schema
It is mutually believed in a population P that
Ψ if and only if some situation S holds such
that:
1. Everyone in P has reason to believe that
S holds.
2. S indicates to everyone in P that every-
one in P has reason to believe that S
holds.
3. S indicates to everyone in P that Ψ.
The situation S, used above in the mutual belief in-
duction schema, is the context of what has been said.
This schema supports a weak model of mutual be-
liefs, that is more akin to mutual assumptions or mu-
tual suppositions[13]. Mutual beliefs can be inferred
based on some evidence, but these beliefs may depend
on underlying assumptions that are easily defeasible.
This model can be implemented using Gallier’s theory
of autonomous belief revision and the corresponding
system[4].
A key part of this model is that some types of
evidence provide better support for beliefs than
other types. The types of evidence considered are
categorized and ordered based on the source of
the evidence: hypothesis < default < inference
< linguistic < physical(See [2, 4]). This ordering
reflects the relative defeasibility of different assump-
tions. Augmenting the strength of an assumption thus
decreases its relative defeasibility.
A claim of this paper is that one role of IRU’s is to en-
sure that these assumptions are supported by evidence,
thus decreasing the defeasibility of the mutual beliefs
that depend on them[4].
Thus mutual beliefs depend on a defeasible inference
process. All inferences depend on the evidence to sup-
port them, and stronger evidence can defeat weaker ev-
idence. So a mutual belief supported as an inference
can get defeated by linguistic information. In addi-
tion, I adopt an an assumption that a chain of reason-
ing is only as strong as its weakest link:
Weakest Link Assumption: The strength
of a belief P depending on a set of under-
lying assumptions ai, ...an is MIN(Strength
(ai, ...an))
This seems intuitively plausible and means that the
strength of belief depends on the strength of underly-
ing assumptions, and that for all inference rules that
depend on multiple premises, the strength of an in-
ferred belief is the weakest of the supporting beliefs.
This representation of mutual belief differs from
the common representation in terms of an iterated
conjunction[11] in that: (1) it relocates information
from mental states to the environment in which utter-
ances occur; (2) it allows one to represent the different
kinds of evidence for mutual belief; (3) it controls rea-
soning when discrepancies in mutual beliefs are discov-
ered since evidence and assumptions can be inspected;
(4) it does not consist of an infinite list of statements.
3 Inference of Understanding
This section examines the assumption from the deter-
ministic model that: (2) Propositions representing
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beliefs and intentions get added to the context by the
unilateral action of one conversant3. This assumption
will also be examined in section 5.
The key claim of this section is that agents monitor the
effects of their utterance actions and that the next ac-
tion by the addressee is taken as evidence of the effect
of the speaker’s utterance4. That the utterance will
have the intended effect is only a hypothesis at the
point where the utterance has just been made, irrespec-
tive of the intentions of the speaker. This distinguishes
this account from others that assume either that utter-
ance actions always succeed or that they succeed unless
the addressee previously believed otherwise[11, 8].
I adopt the assumption that the participants in a dia-
logue are trying to achieve some purpose[7]. Some as-
pects of the structure of dialogue arises from the struc-
ture of these purposes and their relation to one another.
The minimal purpose of any dialogue is that an utter-
ance be understood, and this goal is a prerequisite to
achieving other goals in dialogue, such as commitment
to future action. Thus achieving mutual belief of un-
derstanding is an instance of the type of activity that
agents must perform as they collaborate to achieve the
purposes of the dialogue. I claim that a model of the
achievement of mutual belief of understanding can be
extended to the achievement of other goals in dialogue.
Achieving understanding is not unproblematic, it is
a process that must be managed, just as other goal
achieving processes are[3]. Inference of mutual under-
standing relies upon some evidence, e.g. the utterance
that is made, and a number of underlying assumptions.
The assumptions are given with the inference rule be-
low.
say(A, B, u, p) --A->
understand(B, u, p) [evidence-type]
Assumptions =
{ copresent(A, B, u) [evidence-type]
attend(B, u) [evidence-type]
hear(B, u) [evidence-type]
bel(B, realize(u, p)) [evidence-type]
}
This schema means that when A says u to B intending
to convey p, that this leads to the mutual belief that
B understands u as p under certain assumptions. The
assumptions are that A and B were copresent, that B
was attending to the utterance event, that B heard the
utterance, and that B believes that the utterance u
realizes the intended meaning p.
The [evidence-type] annotation indicates the
strength of evidence supporting the assumption. All of
3This is an utterance action version of the STRIPS
assumption.
4Except for circumstances where it is clear that the flow of
the conversation has been interrupted.
the assumptions start out supported by no evidence;
their evidence type is therefore hypothesis. It isn’t
until after the addressee’s next action that an assump-
tion can have its strength modified.
The claim here is that one class of IRU’s addresses
these assumptions underlying the inference of mutual
understanding. Each type of IRU, the assumption ad-
dressed and the evidence type provided is given in Fig-
ure 1. Examples are provided in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
It is also possible that A intends that BY saying u,
which realizes p, B should make a certain inference q.
Then B’s understanding of u should include B making
this inference. This adds an additional assumption:
bel(B, license(p,q)) [evidence-type]
Thus assuming that q was inferred relies on the as-
sumption that B believes that p licenses q in the con-
text.
Figure 1 says that prompts, repetitions, paraphrases
and making inferences explicit all provide linguistic ev-
idence of attention. All that prompts such as uh huh
do is provide evidence of attention. However repeti-
tions, paraphrases and making inferences explicit also
demonstrate complete hearing. In addition, a para-
phrase and making an inference explicit provides lin-
guistic evidence of what proposition the paraphraser
believes the previous utterance realizes. Explicit infer-
ences additionally provide evidence of what inferences
the inferrer believes the realized proposition licenses in
this context.
In each case, the IRU addresses one or more as-
sumptions that have to be made in order to infer
that mutual understanding has actually been achieved.
The assumption, rather than being a hypothesis
or a default, get upgraded to a support type of
linguistic as a result of the IRU. The fact that
different IRU’s address different assumptions leads to
the perception that some IRU’s are better evidence
for understanding than others, e.g. a paraphrase is
stronger evidence of understanding than a repeat[3].
In addition, any next utterance by the addressee can
upgrade the strength of the underlying assumptions to
default (See Figure 1). Of course default evidence is
weaker than linguistic evidence. The basis for these
default inferences will be discussed in section 5.
3.1 Example of a Repetition
Consider example 1 in section 1. Ray, in (8), repeats
Harry’s assertion from (7). This upgrades the evidence
for the assumptions of hearing and attention associated
with utterance (7) from hypothesis to linguistic.
The assumption about what proposition p7 is realized
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Next Assumption Evidence
Utterance addressed Type
PROMPT attention linguistic
REPEAT hearing, attention linguistic
PARAPHRASE realize, hearing, attention linguistic
INFERENCE license, realize, hearing, attention linguistic
IMPLICATURE license, realize, hearing, attention linguistic
ANY Next copresence linguistic
Utterance license, realize, hearing, attention default
Figure 1: How the Addressee’s Following utterance upgrades the evidence underlying assumptions
by u7 remains a default. This instantiates the infer-
ence rule for understanding as follows:
say(harry, ray, u7, p7) --A->
understand(Ray, u7, p7) [default]
Assumptions =
{ copresent(harry, ray, u7) [linguistic]
attend(ray, u7) [linguistic]
hear(ray, u7) [linguistic]
bel(ray, realize(u7, p7)) [default]
}
Because of the weakest link assumption, the belief
about understanding is still a default.
3.2 Example of a Paraphrase
Consider the following excerpt:
Example 2:
(18) h. i see. are there any other children
beside your wife?
(19) d. no
(20) h. YOUR WIFE IS AN ONLY CHILD
(21) d. right. and uh wants to give
her some security ..........
Harry’s utterance of (20) is said with a falling intona-
tional contour and hence is unlikely to be a question.
This utterance results in an instantiation of the infer-
ence rule as follows:
say(harry, ray, u20, p20) --A->
understand(Ray, u20, p20) [linguistic]
Assumptions =
{ copresent(harry, ray, u7) [linguistic]
attend(ray, u7) [linguistic]
hear(ray, u7) [linguistic]
bel(ray, realize(u7, p7)) [linguistic]
}
In this case, the belief about understanding is sup-
ported by linguistic evidence since all of the sup-
porting assumptions are supported by linguistic evi-
dence. Thus a paraphrase provides excellent evidence
that an agent actually understood what another agent
meant.
In addition, these IRU’s leave a proposition salient,
where otherwise the discourse might have moved on to
other topics. This is part of the centering function
of IRU’s and is left to future work.
4 Making Inferences Explicit
This section discusses assumption (3) of the determistic
model, namely that: Agents are logically omniscient.
This assumption is challenged by a number of cases
in naturally occurring dialogues where inferences that
follow from what has been said are made explicit. I
restrict the inferences that I discuss to those that are
(a) based on information explicitly provided in the di-
alogue or, (b) licensed by applications of Gricean Max-
ims such as scalar implicature inferences[9].
For example the logical omniscience assumption would
mean that if 1(a) and (b) below are in the context, then
(c) will be as well since it is entailed from (a) and (b).
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(1) a. You can buy an I R A if and only if you do
NOT have an existing pension plan.
b. You have an existing pension plan.
c. You cannot buy an I R A.
The following excerpt demonstrates this structure. Ut-
terance (15) realizes 1a, utterance (16) realizes 1b, and
utterance (17) makes the inference explicit that is given
in 1c for the particular tax year of 1981.
Example 3:
(15) h. oh no.
I R A’s were available
as long as you are not a participant
in an existing pension
(16) j. oh i see.
well i did work i do work for a
company that has a pension
(17) h. ahh. THEN YOU’RE NOT ELIGIBLE
FOR EIGHTY ONE
(18) j. i see, but i am for 82
After (16), since the propositional content of (17) is
inferrable, the assumption that Harry has made this
inference is supported by the inference evidence type:
bel(H, license(p16, p17)) [inference]
According to the model of achieving mutual under-
standing that was outlined in section 3, utterance (17)
provides linguistic evidence that Harry (h) believes
that the proposition realized by utterance (16) licenses
the inference of (17) in this context.
bel(H, license(p16, p17)) [linguistic]
Furthermore, the context here consists of a discussion
of two tax years 1981 and 1982. Utterance (17) selects
eighty one, with a narrow focus pitch accent. This
implicates that there is some other tax year for which
Joe is eligible, namely 1982[9]. Joe’s next utterance,
but I am for 82, reinforces the implicature that Harry
makes in (17), and upgrades the evidence underlying
the assumption that (17) licenses (18) to linguistic.
4.1 Supporting Inferences
A subcase of ensuring that certain inferences get made
involves the juxtaposition of two propositions. These
cases challenge the assumption that: (4) The context
of a discourse is an undifferentiated set of propositions
with no specific relations between them. While this
assumption is certainly not made in most discourse
models, it is often made in semantic models of the
context[14]. In the following segment, Jane (j) de-
scribes her financial situation to Harry (h) and a choice
between a settlement and an annuity.
Example 4:
( 1) j. hello harry, my name is jane
( 2) h. welcome jane
( 3) j. i just retired december first,
and in addition to my pension and
social security, I have a
supplemental annuity
( 4) h. yes
( 5) j. which i contributed to
while i was employed
( 6) h. right
( 7) j. from the state of NJ mutual fund.
and I’m entitled to a lump sum
settlement which would be between
16,800 and 17,800, or a lesser life
annuity. and the choices of the annuity
um would be $125.45 per month.
That would be the maximum
with no beneficiaries
( 8) h. You can stop right there:
take your money.
( 9) j. take the money.
(10) h. absolutely.
YOU’RE ONLY GETTING 1500 A YEAR.
at 17,000, no trouble at all to
get 10 percent on 17,000 bucks.
Harry interrupts her at (8) since he believes he has
enough information to suggest a course of action, and
tells her take your money. To provide support for this
course of action he produces an inference that follows
from what she has told him in (7), namely You’re only
getting 1500 (dollars) a year. support is a general
relation that holds between beliefs and intentions in
this model.
Presumably Jane would have no trouble calculating
that $125.45 a month for 12 months amounts to a little
over $1500 a year, and thus can easily accept this state-
ment that is intended to provide the necessary sup-
port relation, ie. the juxtaposition of this fact against
the advice to take the money conveys that the fact that
she is only getting 1500 dollars a year is a reason for
her to adopt the goal of taking the money, although
this is not explicitly stated.
5 Evidence of Acceptance
In section 3, I examine the assumption that: (2) Propo-
sitions representing beliefs and intentions get added to
the context by the unilateral action of one conversant.
I suggested that this assumption can be replaced by
adopting a model in which agents’ behavior provides
evidence for whether or not mutual understanding has
been achieved. I also discussed some of the effects of
resource bounds, ie. cases of ensuring that or providing
evidence that certain inferences dependent on what is
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said are made.
Achieving understanding and compensating for re-
source bounds are issues for a model of dialogue
whether or not agents are autonomous. But agents’ au-
tonomy means there are a number of other reasons why
A’s utterance to B conveying a proposition p might not
achieve its intended effect: (1) p may not cohere with
B’s beliefs, (2) B may not think that p is relevant, (3) B
may believe that p does not contribute to the common
goal, (4) B may prefer doing or believing some q where
p is mutually exclusive with q, (5) If p is about an ac-
tion, B may want to partially modify p with additional
constraints about how, or when p.
Therefore it is important to distinguish an agent actu-
ally accepting the belief that p or intending to per-
form an action described by p from merely understand-
ing that p was conveyed. Other accounts legislate that
helpful agents should adopt other’s beliefs and inten-
tions or that acceptance depends on whether or not the
agent previously believed ¬ p[11, 8]. But agents can
decide whether as well as how to revise their beliefs[4].
Evidence of acceptance may be given explicitly, but
acceptance can be inferred in some dialogue situations
via the operation of a simple principle of cooperative
dialogue5:
collaborative principle: Conversants
must provide evidence of a detected discrep-
ancy in belief as soon as possible.
This principle claims that evidence of conflict should
be made apparent in order to keep default infer-
ences about acceptance or understanding from go-
ing through. IRU’s such as prompts, repetitions,
paraphrases, and making an inference explicit can-
not function as evidence for conflicts in beliefs or
intentions via their propositional content since they
are informationally redundant. If they are realized
with question intonation, the inference of acceptance
is blocked.
In the dialogue below between Harry (h) and Ruth (r),
Ruth in (39), first ensures that she understood Harry
correctly, and then provides explicit evidence of non-
acceptance in (41), based on her autonomous prefer-
ences about how her money is invested. .
Example 5:
(38) h. and I’d like 15 thousand in a
2 and a half year certificate
(39) r. the full 15 in a 2 and a half?
(40) h. that’s correct
(41) r. GEE. NOT AT MY AGE
In the following example, Joe in (14) makes a statement
that provides propositional content that conflicts with
5This is a simplification of the collaborative planning
principles described in [15].
Harry’s statement in (13) and thus provides evidence
of non-acceptance.
Example 6
(13) h. and -- there’s no reason why you
shouldn’t have an I R A for last year
(14) j. WELL I THOUGHT THEY JUST STARTED
THIS YEAR
Joe’s statement is based on his prior beliefs. In both
of these cases this evidence for conflict is given im-
mediately. However when there is no evidence to the
contrary6, and goals of the discourse require achieve-
ment of acceptance, inferences about acceptance are
licensed as default. They can be defeated later by
stronger evidence.
Without this principle, a conversant might not bring
up an objection until much later in the conversation,
at which point the relevant belief and some inferences
following from that belief will have been added to the
common ground as defaults. The result of this is that
the retraction of that belief results in many beliefs be-
ing revised. The operation of this principle helps con-
versants avoid replanning resulting from inconsistency
in beliefs, and thus provides a way to manage the aug-
mentation of the common ground efficiently.
6 Other hypotheses
The first point to note is that the examples here are
only a subset of the types of IRU’s that occur in dia-
logues. I use the term antecedent to refer to the most
recent utterance which should have added the proposi-
tion to the context. This paper has mainly focused on
cases where the IRU: (1) is adjacent to its antecedent,
rather than remote; (2) realizes a proposition whose an-
tecedent was said by another conversant, (3) has only
one antecedent. It is with respect to this subset of the
data that the alternate hypotheses are examined.
A distributional analysis of a subset of the corpus (171
IRU’s from 24 dialogues consisting of 976 turns), on the
relation of an IRU to its antecedent and the context,
shows that 35% of the tokens occur remotely from their
antecedents, that 32% have more than one antecedent,
that 48% consist of the speaker repeating something
that he said before and 52% consist of the speaker re-
peating something that the other conversant said. So
the data that this paper focuses on accounts for about
30% of the data.
6This displaying of evidence to the contrary was called an
interruption in [15].
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6.1 Indirect Question Hypothesis
In example (1) of section 1, an alternative account of
Ray’s repetition in (8) is that it is a question of some
kind. This raises a number of issues: (1) Why doesn’t it
have the form of a question?, (2) What is it a question
about?, and (3) Why is it never denied?.
Of 171 IRU’s, only 28 are realized with rising ques-
tion intonation. Of these 28, 6 are actually redundant
questions with question syntax, and 14 are followed by
affirmations.
If these are generally questions, then one possible an-
swer to what the question is about is that Ray is ques-
tioning whether he actually heard properly. But then
why doesn’t he use an intonational contour that con-
veys this fact as Ruth does in example 5? On an ef-
ficiency argument, it is hard to imagine that it would
have cost Ray any more effort to have done so.
Finally, if it were a question it would seem that it
should have more than one answer. While 50 of these
IRU’s are followed by an affirmation such as that’s cor-
rect, right, yup, none of them are ever followed by a
denial of their content. It seems an odd question that
only has one answer.
6.2 Dead Air Hypothesis
Another hypothesis is that IRU’s result from the radio
talk show environment in which silence is not tolerated.
So agents produce IRU’s because they cannot think of
anything else to say but feel as though they must say
something.
The first point to note is that IRU’s actually occur
in dialogues that aren’t on the radio[1]. The second
question is why an agent would produce an IRU, rather
than some other trivial statement such as I didn’t know
that. Third, why don’t these utterance correlate with
typical stalling behavior such as false starts, pauses,
and filled pauses such as uhhh.
The dead air hypothesis would seem to rely on an as-
sumption that at unpredictable intervals, agents just
can’t think very well. My claim is that IRU’s are re-
lated to goals, that they support inferencing and ad-
dress assumptions underlying mutual beliefs, ie. they
are not random. In order to prove this it must be pos-
sible to test the hypothesis that it is only important
propositions that get repeated, paraphrased or made
explicit. This can be based on analyzing when the
information that is repeated has been specifically re-
quested, such as in the caller’s opening question or by
a request for information from Harry. It should also be
possible to test whether the IRU realizes a proposition
that plays a role in the final plan that Harry and the
caller negotiate. However this type of strong evidence
against the dead air hypothesis is left to future work.
7 Discussion
It should be apparent from the account that the types
of utterances examined here are not really redundant.
The reason that many models of belief transfer in di-
alogue would characterize them as redundant follows
from a combination of facts: (1) The representation of
belief in these models has been binary; (2) The effects
of utterance actions are either assumed to always hold,
or to hold as defaults unless the listener already be-
lieved otherwise. This means that these accounts can-
not represent the fact that a belief must be supported
by some kind of evidence and that the evidence may be
stronger or weaker. It also follows from (2) that these
models assume that agents are not autonomous, or at
least do not have control over their own mental states.
But belief revision is surely an autonomous process;
agents can choose whether to accept a new belief or
revise old beliefs[4, 8].
The occurrence of IRU’s in dialogue has many ramifi-
cations for a model of dialogue. Accounting for IRU’s
has two direct effects on a dialogue model. First it re-
quires a model of mutual beliefs that specifies how mu-
tual beliefs are inferred and how some mutual beliefs
can be as weak as mutual suppositions. One function
of IRU’s is to address the assumptions on which mutual
beliefs are based. Second the assumption that propo-
sitions representing beliefs and intentions get added to
the context by the unilateral action of one conversant
must be dropped. This account replaces that assump-
tion with a model in which the evidence of the hearer
must be considered to establish mutual beliefs. The
claim here is that both understanding and acceptance
are monitored. The model outlined here can be used
for different types of dialogue, including dialogues in
which agents are constructing mutual beliefs to sup-
port future action by them jointly or alone.
How and when agents decide to augment the strength
of evidence for a belief has not been addressed in this
work as yet. Future work includes analyzing the corpus
with respect to whether the IRU plays a role in the final
plan that is negotiated between the conversants.
8 Acknowledgements
Discussions with Aravind Joshi, Ellen Prince and Bon-
nie Webber have been extremely helpful in the devel-
opment of these ideas. In addition I would like to
thank Herb Clark, Sharon Cote, Julia Galliers, Ellen
Germain, Beth Ann Hockey, Megan Moser, Hideyuki
Nakashima, Owen Rambow, Craige Roberts, Phil Sten-
ton, and Steve Whittaker for the influence of their ideas
and for useful discussions.
7
References
[1] Jean C. Carletta. Risk Taking and Recovery in
Task-Oriented Dialogue. PhD thesis, Edinburgh
University, 1992.
[2] Herbert H. Clark and Catherine R. Marshall. Def-
inite reference and mutual knowledge. In Joshi,
Webber, and Sag, editors, Elements of Discourse
Understanding, pages 10–63. CUP, Cambridge,
1981.
[3] Herbert H. Clark and Edward F. Schaefer. Con-
tributing to discourse. Cognitive Science, 13:259–
294, 1989.
[4] Julia R. Galliers. Cooperative interaction as
strategic belief revision. In M.S. Deen, editor,
Cooperating Knowledge Based Systems, page 1.
Springer Verlag, 1991.
[5] H. P. Grice. William James Lectures. 1967.
[6] Barbara J. Grosz, Aravind K. Joshi, and Scott
Weinstein. Towards a computational theory of dis-
course interpretation. Unpublished Manuscript,
1986.
[7] Barbara J. Grosz and Candace L. Sidner. Atten-
tions, intentions and the structure of discourse.
Computational Linguistics, 12:175–204, 1986.
[8] Barbara J. Grosz and Candace L. Sidner. Plans
for discourse. In Cohen, Morgan and Pollack, eds.
Intentions in Communication, MIT Press, 1990.
[9] Julia Hirschberg. A Theory of Scalar Implicature.
PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Computer
and Information Science, 1985.
[10] David Lewis. Convention. Harvard University
Press, 1969.
[11] Diane Litman and James Allen. Recognizing
and relating discourse intentions and task-oriented
plans. In Cohen, Morgan and Pollack, eds. Inten-
tions in Communication, MIT Press, 1990.
[12] Martha Pollack, Julia Hirschberg, and Bonnie
Webber. User participation in the reasoning pro-
cess of expert systems. In AAAI82, 1982.
[13] Ellen F. Prince. On the function of existential
presupposition in discourse. In Papers from 14th
Regional Meeting. CLS, Chicago, IL, 1978.
[14] Robert C. Stalnaker. Assertion. In Peter Cole,
editor, Syntax and Semantics, Volume 9: Prag-
matics, pages 315–332. Academic Press, 1978.
[15] Marilyn A. Walker and Steve Whittaker. Mixed
initiative in dialogue: An investigation into dis-
course segmentation. In Proc. 28th Annual Meet-
ing of the ACL, pages 70–79, 1990.
8
